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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED BY FAILING TO 
RENDER ANY FINDINGS OR CONCLUSIONS AS TO 
WHETHER MS. BEGAY HAD ILLEGALLY PROCESSED 
OR DISTRIBUTED PEYOTE AND THE CITY WAS 
PREJUDICED BY THE COMMISSION'S FAILURE 
Ms. Begay was terminated from her employment with the Salt Lake City 
Police Department for failing to abide by federal law by (1) converting all or 
portions of non-living peyote plants into a powder by using a coffee grinder and 
then, on at least two occasions, giving that peyote powder to others who could not 
afford to purchase peyote from legitimate sources; and (2) growing 87 peyote 
plants in her home. (R. 5-10). A great deal of testimony was given on both 
activities. Yet, the Commission only made a finding and a conclusion concerning 
whether Ms. Begay was engaged in the "growing, i.e. manufacture and 
cultivation" of peyote. (R. 30). The Commission was completely silent on the 
issue of whether Ms. Begay processed and/or distributed peyote. 
This Court has determined that an agency "must make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law that are adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful 
appellate review." Adams v. Bd. Of Rev. of Industrial Comrn'n., 821 P.2d 1, 4 
(Utah App. 1991). In Adams, this Court stated: 
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the 
Commission, the findings must be "sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Acton v. Deliran, 131 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 
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(Utah 1979). . . The failure of an agency to make adequate findings 
of fact on material issues renders its findings "arbitrary and 
capricious" unless the evidence is "clear, uncontroverted and capable 
of only one conclusion." Id. (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 
233, 236 (Utah 1983)). 
Id. at 4-5. Although the Adams case dealt with a Commission governed by the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act, this Court has also enunciated this same 
principle in a case involving a Civil Service Commission. Lucas, 949 P.2d at 755, 
n. 5. 
Here, the issue as to whether Ms. Begay processed and distributed peyote in 
violation of federal law was, indeed, material. Ms. Begay was investigated and 
ultimately terminated from her employment for failing to abide by the federal laws 
that prohibit those who are not properly registered from processing and 
distributing peyote. In his notice of a pre-disciplinary hearing (R. 155, pp. 194-
197), Assistant Chief Don Llewellyn made it clear that Ms. Begay had an 
obligation to comply with federal criminal law, including 21 U.S.C. 841(a), 21 
U.S.C. 802(6), (15) and (22). The conduct at issue was not the use of peyote in a 
bone fide religious ceremony. Ms. Begay's conduct that was deemed to be 
violative of Department policy and federal law involved the processing and 
distributing of peyote and the growing of 87 peyote plants. 
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) specifically states 
that it does "not prohibit such regulation of those persons who cultivate, harvest, 
or distribute peyote..." See 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(2). Additionally, 21 C.F.R. § 
1307.31 requires that "any person who manufactures peyote for or distributes 
peyote to the Native American Church however is required to obtain registration 
annually and to comply with all other requirements of law." The Chief of Police 
based his decision to terminate Ms. Begay's employment, in part, on the basis that 
she ground dried peyote plants into a powdery substance at her home using a 
coffee grinder and on at least two occasions, Ms. Begay took the peyote powder 
she had prepared to another location and provided that peyote to one or more 
members of her family who had fallen on hard times. Even though the issue of 
processing and distributing peyote was a key factor in the Chiefs decision making 
process, the Commission made no finding on this issue. 
The Commission's failure to render any findings or conclusions on this 
material issue was not precipitated by a lack of evidence. To the contrary, 
substantial evidence was presented on the issue of whether Ms. Begay processed 
or distributed peyote in violation of the law such that the Commission was remiss 
in not rendering a single finding or conclusion on this issue. (See Brief of 
Petitioner, pp. 18-20). In her Brief of Appellee (Aple. Br.) Ms. Begay admits that 
the evidence is "clear and uncontroverted" that Ms. Begay ground dried peyote 
into powder and shared that powder with other church members. (Aple. Brief, pp. 
1 0 - 1 1 ) . 
Recently, this Court stated that the "Commission is under an obligation to 
address each of the grounds for termination stated by the department head." 
Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 UT App 274, If 13. When an allegation, if 
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proven, would violate a department policy, and "could possibly add further 
support to the charges against" against the officer, "it must be considered." Id. 
Here, Chief Dinse, in his letter of termination (Pet. App. Exh. D; R. 5-10) 
detailed the facts he considered significant, including Ms. Begay's grinding the 
dried peyote into powder and providing that powder to members of her church, 
and concluded that Ms. Begay was not and is not "registered with the federal Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) to manufacture or distribute peyote." (R. at 
6). He concluded that "violations of that law may result in a felony conviction 
with significant criminal sanctions." (R. 9). Even Ms. Begay, in her Brief of 
Appellee, recognizes that distribution of peyote can violate the law. She states: 
From the testimony of Mr. Ellis, it appears that if Begay's conduct amounts to 
distribution of peyote without registration, this could result in any number of 
federal consequences, ranging from criminal, civil, or administrative penalties. 
(Aple. Br. at 16). This admission by Ms. Begay further underscores the 
importance of the distribution issue. If proven, her behavior would violate police 
policy which requires police officers to obey and uphold all laws and would 
support the Chiefs decision to terminate Ms. Begay because, as Chief of Police, he 
"cannot and will not tolerate violations of federal and state drug laws by 
employees of his Department." (R. at 9). (See, also, Ogden City, 2005 UT App 
274 at 113). 
The Commission's decision should be reversed because it failed to render 
any findings or conclusions on the key issue of whether Ms. Begay processed and 
A 
distributed peyote in violation of federal law. A finding that Ms. Begay had 
processed and distributed peyote in violation of federal law could have clearly 
affected the outcome of the proceedings by leading the Commission to a different 
result. 
II. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE LAW WAS CONFUSING AS IT APPLIED TO 
MS. BEGAY'S CONDUCT 
In Finding No. 16, the Commission found that "Assistant Police Chief 
Donald Llewellyn wrote a letter to Ms. Begay stating that he had reviewed certain 
facts with the City Attorney and was unable to conclude that she had violated 
policy by illegally using peyote." (R. 31, emphasis added). From this, the 
Commission finds in paragraph 16 that u[c]onfusion exists as to how the law 
applies to Ms. Begay's conduct." (R. 30). 
Analysis of Assistant Chief Llewellyn's letter in its totality evidences two 
distinct issues: (1) Ms. Begay was subject to discipline for her role in cultivating, 
manufacturing, processing and distributing peyote and (2) the Department was not 
pursuing discipline for her ceremonial use and possession of peyote. Accordingly, 
relying on whatever "confusion" the Commission perceived as to the use issue to 
decide the cultivating, manufacturing, processing and distributing issue was 
inappropriate. It is undisputed that Ms. Begay was not disciplined because she 
used peyote in religious ceremonies. Therefore, statements about possession and 
use in religious ceremonies have no relevancy in evaluating Ms. Begay's 
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discipline for cultivation, manufacture, processing and distribution of peyote. 
There is no evidence to marshal that would indicate that there was confusion as to 
the law on the part of either Assistant Chief Llewellyn or Chief Dinse, the ultimate 
decision maker. 
In response to the City's argument set forth in its Brief of Petitioner on the 
issue, Ms. Begay suggests that the confusion exists and is excused because the 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) does not define the terms 
"distribute or manufacture." (Aple. Br. at 13). Without support, Ms. Begay 
concludes that distribution and manufacturing "are inherent parts of religious use 
and possession of peyote." (Aple. Br. at 14). Ms. Begay rejects the application of 
the definitions of those terms that are found in 21 U.S.C. § 802 as being 
inapplicable to the AIRFA. Ms. Begay's theory, however, does not address the 
provision of that act which states: 
This section does not prohibit such reasonable regulation and registration 
by the Drug Enforcement Administration of those persons who cultivate, 
harvest, or distribute peyote as may be consistent with the purposes of this 
section and section 1996 of this title. 
42 U.S.C. 1996(a)(b)(2). This provision suggests that, in fact, cultivation, 
harvesting, and distribution are viewed as separate and distinct activities that can 
and are regulated by the DEA More importantly, Ms. Begay overlooks 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1307.31 which specifically refers to the listing of peyote as a controlled 
substance in Schedule I. While that provision states that Schedule I does not apply 
to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the NAC, it 
states: 
Any person who manufactures peyote for or distributes peyote to the Native 
American Church, however, is required to obtain registration annually and 
to comply with all other requirements of law. 
(R. 421). This clear separation of the activities of manufacturing and distributing 
from the activity of use would indicate that, contrary to Ms. Begay's assertion, 
manufacturing and distributing are not deemed to be the same as ceremonial use. 
The definitional terms "manufacture" and "distribution" are provided in 21 U.S.C. 
§ 802 and apply to Ms. Begay's activities. 
Nothing in Assistant Chief Llewellyn's letter reveals "confusion" as 
to how the law applies to Ms. Begay's conduct of growing peyote plants 
and processing dried plants into peyote powder. (R. 155 at p. 196). More 
importantly, Chief Dinse, in his termination letter, expressed no confusion 
as to the law that applied to Ms. Begay's conduct: 
Based upon a legal review provided to me by the City Attorney, I 
must conclude that your cultivation of peyote does meet the federal 
definition of manufacturing. The federal statutory definition of 
manufacturing was provided to you in Assistant Chief Llewellyn's 7 
February 2003 letter. (R. 8). 
The Commission erred in making the finding that confusion existed as to 
how the law applied to Ms. Begay's conduct (Finding No. 16) and further erred by 
concluding that because of "confusion" on the law a lesser disciplinary 
punishment was warranted (Conclusion No. 3). The laws are not confusing. The 
record supports what the laws cited above make clear: use, possession, and 
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transportation of peyote for bona fide religious ceremonies are protected; 
manufacturing and distribution of peyote for those same ceremonies is not 
protected unless a person is authorized by the government to do so. 
The position Ms. Begay takes in her Brief of Appellee (i.e. that 
manufacturing and distribution are the same protected activities as use and 
possession) is at odds with the testimony, including hers, that was presented to the 
Civil Service Commission. At the Civil Service Hearing, Jerry Ellis, who has 
been employed by the DEA for 30 years and has had the responsibility of 
regulating the peyote distributors, testified concerning the manufacturing and 
distribution of peyote. Mr. Ellis's expert testimony was unrefuted. Even Ms. 
Begay recognizes that peyote must be obtained through the right process in order 
for it to be legal. (See, R. 155 at p. 136, 11. 13-17). Ms. Begay was aware of the 
federal law as evidenced by the copy she attached to a letter she wrote to the 
Chief. (R. 155 at pp. 50-55). Ms Kristi Begay testified about an article she 
created entitled "A Bit of 'Peyote 101'" which suggests that individuals must 
obtain peyote from legal dealers and custodians who have legal DEA numbers. (R. 
155 at pp. 214-215). 
Ms. Begay's conduct of growing, processing and distributing peyote was 
not protected by the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. It is undisputed that 
she was not a DEA licensed distributor, authorized custodian or roadman. 
Therefore, she had no safe harbor or immunity to shield her. Simply put, her 
planting, cultivation and growing of the 87 peyote plants was illegal and 
constitutes a felony under the above cited statutes. Likewise, processing the dry 
peyote into a powder and then giving it to others who could not legally obtain it 
was not a protected activity under the law. 
The federal laws make it clear what activities are protected and what 
activities are not. The Commission's confusion as to the legal interpretation of the 
controlling statutes and its inability to distinguish between protected activities and 
those that are not protected is not a valid ground upon which to overturn the 
Chiefs decision. 
The Commission abused its discretion by ignoring valid, undisputed 
testimony on the legal factors of the case, relying instead on the fact that the 
Commission simply did not understand the law. The City has been prejudiced by 
this erroneous ruling based upon the Commission's confusion and inability to 
apply the law to the facts and requests that this Court vacate the Commission's 
decision. 
III. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT TERMINATION 
WAS DISPROPORTIONATE BECAUSE IT WAS CONFUSED 
AS TO HOW FEDERAL LAW AFFECTED MS. BEGAY'S CONDUCT 
As set forth in Argument II, above, the Commission's "confusion" as to 
how the law applied to Ms. Begay's conduct was erroneous, particularly in light of 
the fact that there was no evidence presented that indicated that any of the 
witnesses were "confused" or did not understand the law. Even if the 
Commission, indeed, was confused and did not understand how to interpret the 
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law, the Commission committed error in considering any complexity in the law as 
a mitigating factor for determining whether the Chief abused his discretion in his 
decision to terminate Ms. Begay for her conduct. 
It is well recognized that in reviewing the Chiefs discipline, the 
Commission must ask two questions. First, do the facts support the charges made? 
Second, if so, do the charges warrant the sanction imposed? Kelly v. Salt Lake 
City Civil Service Commission, 2000 UT App 235, }^16. It is with the second 
inquiry of its examination that the Commission "stepped out of the arena of 
discretion and thereby crossed the law." Kelly, 2000 UT 235 at j^ 15. The 
Commission failed to properly examine the question "do the charges warrant the 
sanction imposed?" The Commission allowed its confusion about the law to 
interfere with its responsibility to follow the recognized principles established for 
reviewing the Chiefs disciplinary decision. This abdication of responsibility 
robbed the Chief of his discretion to impose discipline. 
In Ogden City v. Harmon, 2005 UT App 274 this Court stated: "In 
determining whether a sanction of dismissal is warranted, the Commission must 
affirm the sanction if it is (1) appropriate to the offense and (2) consistent with 
previous sanctions imposed by the department." Id. at }^16. Here, Ms. Begay 
offered no evidence of inconsistency. Therefore, the focus of inquiry is on 
whether the sanction was appropriate. This Court recognized that due deference 
must be given to the chiefs punishment decision: 
i n 
In weighing the punishment against the offense, the Commission must give 
deference to the chiefs choice of punishment because, as the head of the 
...Department, he is in a position to balance the competing concerns in 
pursuing a particular disciplinary action. Discipline imposed for employee 
misconduct is within the sound discretion of the chief." (citations omitted) 
Id. at Tf 17. Therefore, the Commission may only reverse the chiefs choice of 
punishment as "unduly excessive only when the punishment is 'clearly 
disproportionate' to the offense, and 'exceeds the bound of reasonableness and 
rationality.'" Id.. 
This Court recognized that Utah law has given little guidance on precise 
factors to be used when weighing the proportionality of the discipline with the 
offense, noting that an "exemplary service record and tenuous evidence of 
misconduct may tip the balance against termination." Id. at ^18. This is where Ms. 
Begay wants this Court's review to end. In her Brief of Appellee, she repeatedly 
points to her good service record and makes the unsupported conclusion that there 
is little, if any, evidence of misconduct. This matter argues for a more thorough 
analysis, however, 
The Ogden City Court provided a list of other factors to consider when 
evaluating the proportionality of the offense. Specifically: 
(a) whether the violation is directly related to the employee's official duties 
and significantly impedes his or her ability to carry out those duties; (b) 
whether the offense was of a type that adversely affects the public 
confidence in the department; (c) whether the offense undermines the 
morale and effectiveness of the department; or (d) whether the offense was 
committed willfully or knowingly, rather than negligently or inadvertently. 
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Id. at <[} 18. There was sufficient evidence presented as to each of the above cited 
factors, to wit: 
Whether the violation is directly related to the employee's official 
duties and significantly impedes his or her ability to carry out those duties: 
Police officers take an oath of office and swear to uphold the law. (R. 
153 at p. 80,11. 17-25); 
Felonies are particularly grievous crimes. In fact, an individual who has a 
felony on his/her record cannot become a police officer. (R. 153 at p. 82); 
Federal drug laws are as important as any law in the country and apply to 
Salt Lake City Police officers as well as they do any citizen in the United States. 
Police officers have an obligation to enforce and to obey those laws. (R. 153 at p. 
82); 
Whether the offense was of a type that adversely affects the public 
confidence in the Department: 
IA received a letter from "a concerned citizen" that stated, in part, "Because 
Terry is in law enforcement, this is betraying not only the public, but the Native 
American people as well. Terry is supposed to be someone who upholds the law, 
not abuse it. She should not use her uniform to get away with any illegal 
activities." (R. 155 at p. 49); 
At the beginning of his administration, Chief Dinse published and 
personally discussed with his officers certain core values. Among those values 
was reverence for the law. Chief Dinse stated that public confidence is eroded if 
police officers do not obey the law. (R. 153 at pp. 82-83); 
If Ms. Begay continued in public service there would be a reduction of 
credibility and trust. (R. 153 at p. 90); 
Her credibility would be very subject to questioning and her ability to lead 
would be hurt seriously by that. (R. 153 at p. 90); 
1 1 
Whether the offense undermines the morale and effectiveness of the 
department: 
Ms. Begay's violation of law amounting to a felony could not be tolerated 
within the police department because 1) Ms. Begay, as a lieutenant and part of the 
management team, had a responsibility to set an example for everyone, not only 
the community but for those people that she supervised, 2) there would be a 
reduction of credibility and trust among those that Ms. Begay would supervise, 3) 
the ability of the police administration to lead would be seriously hurt. (R. 153 at 
pp. 90-91); 
Whether the offense was committed willfully or knowingly, rather than 
negligently or inadvertently: 
As a Police Lieutenant, Ms. Begay had an affirmative duty to learn and 
comply with the laws that governed her religious practices. (R. 9); 
Even Ms. Begay recognizes that peyote must be obtained through the right 
process in order for it to be legal: 
"Okay. The person that's putting on the meeting gets hold of the 
Roadman, the person that's going to conduct the meeting. That 
person is the custodian usually, they get hold of the custodian and 
order the medicine through somebody in Texas or Mexico that have 
DEA numbers. Everything is legal that way . . ." (emphasis added) 
(R. 155 at p. 136,11. 13-17). 
Ms. Begay was aware of the federal law as evidenced by the documents 
analyzing "peyote statutes," including 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31, that she attached to a 
letter she wrote to the Chief. (R. 155 at pp. 50-55). 
In her predisciplinary hearing, Ms. Begay stated: 
So when it says the DEA has requirements for reasonable 
registration under that. And I understand why people have -
custodians have DEA numbers. It needs to be that way to be 
protected so people don't abuse it. (R. 155 at p. 203). 
An application of the factors set forth in Ogden City tip the balance in favor of 
termination. 
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Ms. Begay was not immune for processing and growing peyote. Without 
immunity, Ms. Begay's conduct indeed could well be described as a violation of 
federal drug laws, a felony offense and thus an obvious violation of the SLCPD's 
police D20-02-00.00 which states: "Employees shall obey all constitutional, 
criminal and civil laws imposed on them as a member of the Department and as 
citizens of this state and country." 
Chief Dinse's sanction is not so clearly disproportionate to the charges that 
Ms. Begay failed to abide by law as to exceed the limits of reasonableness and 
rationality. The only evidence before the Commission as to what sanctions have 
been imposed for police officers whose conduct rises to the level of constituting a 
felony is that of Chief Dinse. Despite the Chiefs undisputed testimony, the 
Commission concluded that a lesser sanction such as counseling or a warning 
should have been imposed because of confusion as to how federal law affected her 
conduct. The Commission concluded this without having any evidence before it 
that such lesser sanctions were routinely or ever used with officers whose conduct 
ran afoul of significant laws. Additionally, the Commission made this conclusion 
despite the fact that there was no evidence at all that Chief Dinse was confused as 
to how the federal law applied to Ms. Begay's growing and processing of peyote. 
Based upon the substantial evidence supporting the charge that Ms. Begay 
violated the policy requiring adherence to the law and the undisputed testimony as 
to why termination was the appropriate sanction, the Commission erred in 
concluding that termination was disproportionate based upon its confusion as to 
the interpretation of the law. By failing to acknowledge any of the Chiefs reasons 
for imposing the discipline he did, the Commission ignored the Kelly test because 
it was confused. Because the Commission failed to properly apply the law when it 
addressed the question, do the charges warrant the sanction imposed, the 
Commission abused its discretion by stepping outside the legal boundaries set 
forth in Kelly. This Court should overturn the Commission's ruling and affirm the 
Chiefs decision to terminate Ms. Begay's employment. 
IV. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING THERE 
WAS NO PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE PEYOTE PLANTS 
WERE GROWING AND, INSTEAD, FINDING THE PERSUASIVE 
EVIDENCE WAS THAT THE PLANTS WERE MERELY BEING 
PRESERVED IN SOIL FOR FUTURE USE IN THE SAME WAY 
REFRIGERATORS ARE USED TO PRESERVE FRUITS 
AND VEGETABLES AND BY FINDING THAT THIS 
WAS IN ACCORD WITH NAC PRACTICES 
When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a petitioner must first 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite 
this evidence, the findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence. In re Estate of Bar tell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
Here, the Commission found (1) "no persuasive evidence" existed that the peyote 
plants or buttons were growing; (2) the "persuasive evidence" was that the plants 
were merely being preserved in soil for future use in the same way refrigerators 
are used to preserve fruits and vegetables; and (3) that this "preservation" was in 
accord with the NAC practices. 
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Ms. Begay recognized that the City met its burden to marshal the evidence. 
(Aple. Br. at 17). Ms. Begay does not challenge the evidence presented by the 
City that demonstrates that, despite the evidence marshaled in support of the 
evidence, the findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of 
the evidence. The evidence marshaled by the City against the Commission's 
Finding 15 was significant. (Pet. Br. at pp. 35-41). 
Now, Ms. Begay, in her Brief of Appellee, admits that, indeed, the peyote 
was "live." In her Statement of Facts, she states that "the police went to Begay's 
home and confiscated a bottle of dried peyote powder and 87 live peyote buttons." 
(Aple. Br. at p. 4). She refers to the 87 peyote buttons as "plants." (Aple. Br. at p. 
6). She also states that "she kept live peyote in soil to preserve it..." (Aple. Br. at 
p.5). Throughout her brief, she admits to "possessing live peyote in dirt in order to 
preserve it in live form." (Aple. Br. at pp. 8,9 and 17). 
Possessing, maintaining, and caring for live peyote plants is far different 
than merely placing the peyote in dirt to preserve it and is in keeping with the bulk 
of the testimony presented to the Commission. That testimony is set forth at 
length in the City's Brief of Petitioner at pages 35-41 and was not refuted by Ms. 
Begay. To the contrary, her statements in her Brief of Appellee support the City's 
position that Ms. Begay was, indeed, growing peyote and that the 87 peyote 
buttons were live plants. 
The Commission's finding that there was no persuasive evidence that Ms. 
Begay was growing peyote largely ignores both the record in this case and the law. 
1£ 
Additionally, the Commission's notion that Ms. Begay's conduct merely 
constituted "preservation" of peyote in accordance with N.A.C. practices is 
inconsistent with the evidence presented and is unsupported in the law. The clear 
weight of the evidence is against the Commission's finding. Ms. Begay's recent 
admissions that the 87 peyote buttons were live plants further refutes the 
Commission's determination that the peyote buttons were not growing, but were 
merely being preserved like an apple in the refrigerator. The City respectfully 
submits that the Commission's findings should be overturned. 
V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
MS. BEGAY DID NOT GROW, CULTIVATE OR 
MANUFACTURE PEYOTE 
The Commission made it clear in its findings and conclusions that it was 
confused as to how the law affected Ms. Begayfs conduct. (Finding 16; 
Conclusion 3; R. 30-31). Despite this apparent confusion, the Commission 
nonetheless formulated the legal conclusion that Ms. Begay "did not grow, 
cultivate or manufacture peyote." (Concl. 1, R. 31). 
The determinative statutes are clear: the use, possession or transportation 
of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes are protected. 
(42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(l)). Those individuals who "cultivate, harvest or distribute 
peyote" are subject to reasonable regulation and registration. (42 U.S.C. § 
1996a(b)(2)). (See also, 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (any person who manufactures 
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peyote for or distributes peyote to the Native American church is required to 
obtain registration annually)). The definitional terms are also straightforward. 
The term "manufacture" means production, preparation, propagation, 
compounding or processing. 21 U.S.C. § 802(15). The term "production" 
includes the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing or harvesting. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 802(22). 
The clear weight of the evidence, and now Ms. Begay5 s own description of 
the live plants (See, Argument IV, supra), demonstrates that Ms. Begay was 
growing 87 peyote plants in her home. 
The terms "planting" and "growing" are so well used in everyday parlance 
that their meaning is within the understanding of the average person. The 
Commission, however, disregarded the standard definitions of "growing" and 
"planting" and, instead, determined that what Ms. Begay did was actually no more 
than "preserving." 
The applicable laws do not specify "preserving" peyote as either a protected 
action or a prohibited one. The Commission has stepped outside the legal 
boundaries by fashioning its own definition of "preserving" and determining 
without legal foundation that "preserving" peyote in the manner Ms. Begay did 
was within the same protected categories as "use," "possession" or 
"transportation." 
The Commission's confusion as to the law results in a conclusion that 
makes no sense - a conclusion that well exceeds the limits of reasonableness or 
1 Q 
rationality. If plants are "growing," "having babies" and are rooted to the bottom 
of their planter boxes, they are in no way similar to vegetables and fruits in a 
refrigerator. No one describes keeping fruits and vegetables in the refrigerator as 
caring for plants. (See, e.g. Aple. Br. at p. 6). The 87 peyote buttons were growing 
and the Commission's conclusion to the contrary is erroneous. 
This Court has stated that an abuse of discretion is: 
... a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment - one that is clearly 
against the logic and the effect of such facts as are presented in 
support of the application, or against the reasonable and probable 
deductions to be drawn from the facts disclosed...It is a legal term to 
indicate that the appellate court is of the opinion that there was 
commission of error of law in the circumstances. It is an 
improvident exercise of discretion; an error of law. 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Utah App. 1991). 
The Commission's reasoning and legal conclusion concerning its 
interpretation of the law are in error. The City submits that the Commission 
abused its discretion in determining that Ms. Begay was not engaged in growing 
peyote and its decision should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the City submits that the Commission has made 
findings that are against the clear weight of the evidence, has failed to make any 
findings or conclusions on a key issue, and has misunderstood and misapplied the 
law. The City has suffered substantial prejudice by the Commission's errors. The 
Commission has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rendering an opinion that 
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exceeds the limits of reasonableness and rationality and has also abused its 
discretion. 
The City requests that this Court grant it relief by vacating the 
Commission's ruling and reinstating Chief Dinse's termination decision. 
DATED this 9th day of September, 2005. 
Senior City Attorney 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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